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Hiring away inventors has long been recognized as a way of learning used by innovative firms. This paperclaims that the characteristics of the knowledge accumulated by an inventor at his current employer affect
what hiring firms can learn from him. The implication is that some inventors are more likely to be hired
away than their coworkers. We analyze the relationship between the type of knowledge embodied by inventors
working at IBM and their probability of moving. Relying on patent data to track the movement of inventors
across firms and to characterize the kind of know-how they hold, we identify the following drivers of inventor
mobility: the quality of their work; the complementarity of their knowledge with that of other inventors; and,
to a lower extent, their expertise in the firm’s core areas in which the firm is not a dominant player. Results
confirm the role of knowledge characteristics behind the mobility of research and development personnel and
suggest that learning is a relevant force in the market for inventors.
Key words : mobility; learning-by-hiring; technology transfer; inventors
History : Received August 25, 2008; accepted September 18, 2009, by Scott Shane, entrepreneurship. Published
online in Articles in Advance March 15, 2010.
1. Introduction
Leading organizations in high-tech industries are
often the source of a great deal of innovative ideas.
Apart from directly launching their own innovations,
they are also at the origin of some innovations devel-
oped either by start-ups created by their own engi-
neers or by firms that hired them away. This is
the case of IBM, an industry leader responsible for
major innovations in the electronics sector. Some of
these innovations were instigated by Glenn Henry, a
computer scientist who, after 21 years at IBM, was
hired away by Dell Computer Corporation in 1988 to
work on product development. Interfirm movements
of inventors are not rare. In a recent survey of Euro-
pean inventors responsible for European Patent Office
patents, 22.5% of them reported at least one change
in employer in the 6–10 year window following their
patent (Giuri et al. 2007).
The literature on innovation has long observed
that scientists who leave their employers to join rival
firms spread their acquired knowledge (Arrow 1962).
Indeed, as Levin et al. (1987) report from a survey
of research and development (R&D) managers, hiring
away skilled personnel is quite an effective learning
mechanism used by firms. Cassiman and Veugelers
(2006), drawing on data from the 1993 Belgian Com-
munity Innovation Survey, indicate that 42% of inno-
vative firms use hiring away to gain access to external
technology, and that this is the prevalent strategy for
external knowledge acquisition. Almeida and Kogut
(1999) find evidence that, in an R&D intensive sec-
tor such as semiconductors, engineer mobility is an
important means of spreading ideas between firms in
certain geographically restricted areas.
This paper suggests that learning-by-hiring is a
significant driver of mobility in high-tech industries.
Unlike previous literature, we analyze the process
from the point of view of the inventors’ knowl-
edge. We hypothesize that the characteristics of the
knowledge accumulated by an inventor at his cur-
rent employer influence what another employer can
learn from him. Consequently, inventors embodying
knowledge with potential for leverage are relatively
more valuable to the market and, therefore, are more
likely to leave their current employer.
Previous research has examined learning-by-hiring
exclusively from the perspective of the hiring firm.
Once hiring away was recognized as a learning mech-
anism (Arrow 1962, Levin et al. 1987), researchers have
focused on analyzing the characteristics of the hiring
firm that shape the intensity of learning. For instance,
Almeida et al. (2003) find that start-up size negatively
impacts the effectiveness of knowledge transfer. Song
et al. (2003) and Rosenkopf and Almeida (2003) sug-
gest that learning-by-hiring is especially useful for
exploring technologically distant knowledge, regard-
less of geographical distance. Nevertheless, previous
literature has not questioned whether the type of tar-
geted knowledge affects what hiring firms can learn
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from it. The only exception is Zucker et al. (2002),
who claim that the involvement of star scientists from
universities is a must for any firm wishing to launch
innovations based on their discoveries. They find that
scientists’ quality influences the probability that they
will move from university to firms.
Another stream of research has analyzed poten-
tial drivers of staff turnover in R&D firms. A first
set of this literature builds on the mechanisms pro-
posed by labor economists as forces behind workers’
mobility.1 Lewis and Yao (2006) use a matching model
to explain the high turnover rates in R&D inten-
sive sectors. They argue that by allowing freedom
of movement, firms are able to attract talented engi-
neers. Fallick et al. (2006) consider innovations as ran-
dom shocks that increase the value of skilled work-
ers’ human capital. Accordingly, mobility mainly rep-
resents a reallocation of resources toward firms with
the best innovations. A second set of literature focuses
on the incentives of the current firm to retain its
researchers. These incentives depend on the compe-
tition threat posed by a moving researcher, who can
replicate and market innovations developed in the
firm, eroding its monopoly position. Hence, mobility
is the result of weighting the cost of retaining the sci-
entist in terms of wages against the cost posed by
competition. Pakes and Nitzan (1983) consider that
mobility will only occur in settings with low set-up
costs and potential third party competitors. Fosfuri
et al. (2001) expect mobility when the hiring firm can
use the technology without competing directly with
the firm where it originated (i.e., with differentiated
products or in other market segments).
This paper contributes to the empirical literature
on mobility of R&D personnel by examining what
characteristics of the inventor’s knowledge stimulate
mobility. We examine this issue in the framework of
the computer, semiconductor, and software industries,
three highly innovative and patent-intensive sectors.
In particular, we identify the trajectory of engineers
initially working at IBM, a very active player in
these sectors. Patent records help to characterize the
career of an inventor as well as the attributes of the
knowledge underlying his innovations. We find that
the quality of an inventor’s work positively influ-
ences the probability of leaving his employer. Con-
versely, the complementarity of his knowledge with
that of other inventors, and his core expertise in areas
where his employer is not a dominant player, are
negatively associated with the probability of moving.
These results support the idea that learning is a rele-
vant force behind inventor mobility.
1 Labor economics models usually consider the following drivers
of mobility: productivity mismatches between workers and firms
(Jovanovic 1979), job shopping for higher wages (Topel and Ward
1992), or external shocks.
2. Theory and Hypotheses
External sources of knowledge are vital for the inno-
vative capabilities of firms (Cohen and Levinthal
1990). As March and Simon (1958) suggest, many
innovations result from borrowing, which can take
many forms but always implies knowledge transfer.
Knowledge often entails a tacit component that is dif-
ficult to specify in a contract and difficult to transfer
(Winter 1987). Because this tacit dimension of knowl-
edge is largely embedded in individuals’ human
capital (Becker 1964), the involvement of creators is
a key component of successful transfer (Zucker et al.
2002). There are several formal ways to acquire the
external know-how embodied in creators, including
hiring them away, taking over their employer, or
establishing a technological alliance. Hiring away is a
particularly effective means of acquiring and transfer-
ring knowledge (Levin et al. 1987), probably because
the inventors participate voluntarily.2
The acquisition of knowledge from other firms
through the hiring of their researchers, known as
“learning-by-hiring” (Song et al. 2003) arises from
the fact that (1) the tacit knowledge behind inno-
vations resides in the human capital of their inven-
tors, and (2) human capital can be transferred to the
new employers. Workers accumulate both tacit and
explicit knowledge through their personal experience,
through the observation of colleagues or through
informal conversations and other information-sharing
mechanisms (Rosen 1972, Nonaka 1994). In partic-
ular, innovative activities involve a large amount
of learning-by-doing and vicarious learning of the
noncodifiable scientific knowledge basis underlying
inventions (Winter 1987, Hoetker and Agarwal 2007).
When a researcher moves, his tacit knowledge is
transferred to the new employer if the latter is able
to combine the inventor’s background with the rest
of capabilities of the firm (Cohen and Levinthal
1990). The new employee contributes to enhancing
the knowledge base of the hiring firm by drawing on
his new employer’s resources to create new innova-
tions or further developments of existing ones and by
generating spillovers through the interaction with his
new coworkers. Rosenkopf and Almeida (2003) con-
firm that mobility produces knowledge flows between
the two firms involved, which increase with the tech-
nological distance between them. In a similar vein,
Song et al. (2003) findings suggest that hiring away
is especially worthwhile when hiring firms enter into
new and distant areas.
The potential for knowledge transfer due to
researcher mobility may, however, be limited by the
embeddedness of such knowledge within team and
2 Conversely, technology-driven takeovers do not guarantee that the
inventors stay in the firm after the acquisition (Ernst and Vitt 2000).
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organization structures. The value of a researcher’s
expertise may depend on the continuity of his
interaction with the colleagues that participated in
the knowledge-generation process. Furthermore, the
overall research line trajectory in which a researcher is
involved is likely to reside at the firm level (Hoetker
and Agarwal 2007). Therefore, mobility of inventors
will play a relevant role in the process of knowledge
transfer if the scientific knowledge basis that they
embody outbalances the role of team and organiza-
tional routines in obtaining further innovations.
On another note, incumbent employers of R&D per-
sonnel face a twofold risk if their inventors leave.
First, a departing researcher can pose competition
to the firm through imitation of the firm’s inno-
vations. Second, the firm loses human capital in
which it may have invested.3 To address these prob-
lems, firms can design contracts that deter employees
from leaving (Pakes and Nitzan 1983). They can also
resort to legal instruments in order to prevent imi-
tation by former employees, including noncompete
covenants (Stuart and Sorenson 2003) and patent pro-
tection. Whereas courts are often reluctant to enforce
the former (Gilson 1999), patents seem more effec-
tive. Kim and Marschke (2005) find that mobility,
especially at the regional level, positively affects the
propensity to patent by firms in high-tech indus-
tries. Hence, in sectors with strong patent protec-
tion, where firms are safeguarded against imitation,
the negative effect posed by a departing researcher
is restricted to the loss of valuable knowledge. This
loss, however, implies the attrition of the incumbent’s
generative appropriability, i.e., its ability to develop
subsequent innovations building on its current inno-
vations (Ahuja 2007).
Thus, R&D firms try to learn from inventors with
previous experience in other innovative firms, which
try to retain them if it is worthwhile. It follows
that mobility is driven by the relative value of the
inventor’s knowledge in the firm with respect to
the market.4 5 This relative value is determined by
(i) the harm suffered by the current employer from its
loss, (ii) the potential value that prospective employ-
ers can extract from it, and (iii) the possibility of
3 Moen (2005) suggests that scientists pay (at least partly) for the
knowledge they accumulate on the job, by accepting wages six per-
cent lower in their first year if they choose an R&D-intensive career.
4 An inventor’s personal characteristics may also affect his proba-
bility of moving. Nevertheless, previous literature has not found
strong evidence in this connection. Zucker et al. (2002) and Geuna
et al. (2006) find no significant effect of personal characteristics in
their analysis of moves from academia. Hoisl (2007) finds that edu-
cation affects the number of moves.
5 We understand “market value” as the value of knowledge for any
prospective alternative employer, regardless of whether or not it is
a direct competitor in the product market. In §4.1 we discuss this
assumption.
effectively transferring this knowledge to the new
employer. We consider four characteristics of the
inventors’ knowledge that influence these factors:
quality, complementarity, fit within the firm’s core
areas, and ascription to areas in which the firm is a
relevant player. We next develop a set of hypothe-
ses as to how these dimensions of the knowledge
embodied by an inventor employed by an innovative
firm in a patent-intensive industry affect his probabil-
ity of moving. Therefore, we focus on the analysis of
mobility from firms that may represent an attractive
source of knowledge in a setting where knowledge is
patent protected, i.e., where learning-by-hiring aims
to improve the technological capabilities of the hiring
firm (not replication).
2.1. Quality
The contribution of an innovation to technologi-
cal progress is referred to as its quality (Lanjouw
and Schankerman 2004). High-quality innovations are
backed by highly relevant scientific knowledge and
have high expected economic value (Harhoff et al.
1999, Hall et al. 2005). The firm responsible for the
innovation can appropriate its direct economic value
if it is patented (in a setting where patents are effec-
tive). Nevertheless, there is another source of value
behind an innovation: its potential to generate future
innovations (Hopenhayn and Mitchell 2001). This
value emerges from the underlying knowledge basis
of the innovation and is difficult to protect. Conse-
quently, it is susceptible to appropriation by other
firms (Ahuja 2007), especially when the knowledge is
highly embodied in the creator of the innovation and
can be captured by hiring him away.
We expect a positive association between the qual-
ity of the knowledge basis held by an inventor and
interfirm mobility. A researcher will switch employ-
ers whenever there is an outside firm where his
knowledge can be more profitably devoted to inno-
vative activities and this higher profitability compen-
sates moving costs (Kim and Marskhe 2005, Lewis
and Yao 2006). More profitable outside innovation
opportunities can be due to the existence of bet-
ter complementary resources and capabilities (e.g.,
research environment and facilities, incentives, access
to markets), or greater scope for spillovers (i.e., knowl-
edge sharing with new colleagues) outside the current
employer. Given a more profitable outside innovation
opportunity, the greater the quality of the knowl-
edge, the greater its relative advantage over the inter-
nal option. This is because innovation opportunities
and knowledge quality have a complementary effect
in the generation of value: an innovation opportunity
will deliver more value if it is developed by an inven-
tor that holds highly relevant scientific knowledge in
the field. As a result, a higher quality of the inventor’s
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knowledge basis implies a higher probability of mov-
ing, assuming that moving costs remain constant. That
is, the existence of better outside innovation opportu-
nities compensates moving costs only for researchers
with a sufficiently high-quality knowledge basis.6 In
line with this idea, Zucker et al. (2002) find that the
quality of biotechnology scientists positively affects
their probability of moving from the university to a
firm.
Hypothesis 1. The higher the quality of the inventor’s
set of knowledge, the more likely he is to move.
2.2. Complementarity
An inventor’s knowledge is complementary to that
of other researchers if the former needs to be com-
bined with the latter to develop its full potential
value. Knowledge complementarity may have differ-
ent sources, mostly related to the use of teams in
inventive activities. First of all, innovations frequently
result from the combination of different types of
knowledge that mutually enhance their value. Given
that these complementary pieces of knowledge are
usually in the hands of inventors with different back-
grounds (Wuchty et al. 2007), innovations are fre-
quently originated in teams. Thus, the know-how of
coinventors working in a project may be mutually
complementary ex ante. Secondly, team-work in the
development of an invention leads, in itself, to the
generation of complementary knowledge. If research
is organized by assigning interdependent tasks to
team members, learning-by-doing will lead to ex post
complementary knowledge even if all coworkers start
the project with independent backgrounds. In this
case, the complementarities generated are specific to
the team members involved in the project. Finally, the
use of innovation teams leaves knowledge embed-
ded in a complex web of relationships (Van de Ven
1986). In this context, team routines play a key role
in the process of value creation, which requires the
continued existence of the whole team of coinventors
(Hoetker and Agarwal 2007).
An inventor with highly complementary know-how
is less likely to move, because his knowledge is partic-
ularly difficult to exploit by any alternative employer.7
Even if complementarity only emerged from the need
6 Note that our argument does not assume that high-quality knowl-
edge can always be used more profitably outside than inside the
current firm. Rather, we argue that, if a better outside innovation
opportunity ever arises, it will induce mobility only for inventors
holding high-quality knowledge.
7 In fact, firms often use teams to protect the knowledge behind
valuable innovations (Liebeskind 1996). According to Ahuja (2007),
this strategy reduces the risk of information leakage through
employee mobility and, therefore, enhances the firm’s degree of
appropriability.
to bring together different types of specialized knowl-
edge, regathering a similar complementary combina-
tion might be a hard task for the new employer.
More importantly, the interdependences and routines
developed during the innovation process can make
it impossible to fully exploit the knowledge held by
an individual inventor without hiring his group of
coinventors.
Hypothesis 2. The higher the degree of complementar-
ity of the inventor’s know-how, the less likely he is to move.
2.3. Core Expertise
The core of an innovative firm comprises technolog-
ical areas typically associated with the firm’s com-
parative advantage. Thus, the innovative activity is
especially intensive in these areas, to which the firm
devotes many of its human and technical resources.
This fact has ambiguous consequences for the poten-
tial mobility of inventors working in these areas. On
the one hand, higher concentration of inventors in
a given area leads to higher overlapping of knowl-
edge. That is, a large amount of researchers working
on the development of very close pieces of technol-
ogy implies very similar knowledge learnt “by doing”
(Cohen and Levinthal 1990). Although task special-
ization moderates this effect, the knowledge acquired
through observation and interaction with coworkers
in this setting is also subject to a high degree of
overlap. Higher knowledge overlap in a technological
area implies lower knowledge loss upon an inventor’s
departure. Consequently, the know-how of an indi-
vidual inventor from a core area is potentially more
useful for the market than for his current employer.
On the other hand, research activities that fall within
a firm’s technological core tend to follow predeter-
mined paths (Song et al. 2003). Because knowledge
from core technological areas is an important source
of added value, firms are especially likely to build
structures to harness it. As a result, core knowl-
edge is deeply embedded in the firm, through well-
established routines and procedures. This knowledge
embeddedness in firm structures hampers knowl-
edge transfer through employee mobility (Hoetker
and Agarwal 2007). In sum, the know-how from the
firm’s core held by an individual inventor is poten-
tially more useful for external employers, but it can
not be easily incorporated in their trajectories. There-
fore, the direct effect of core expertise on the proba-
bility of moving is not clear-cut.
2.4. Technological Dominance
An innovative firm has a dominant position in a tech-
nological field when it accounts for a high portion
of the new technology created in that field. Inventors
from fields dominated by their employers embody
knowledge that is especially valuable in the market.
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First, the firm’s dominant position in a field implies
that its researchers have access to a widespread set
of the know-how available in the field, which they
are able to learn mainly through observation and
interaction with coworkers.8 Second, field dominance
implies relative outside scarcity of the underlying
knowledge. The reason is that dominance is expected
to be inversely related to the existence of alternative
sources of knowledge outside the focal firm.
Interestingly, field dominance may affect the inter-
nal value of an inventor’s knowledge less intensely
than its market value. The internal value of an
inventor working in a field that the firm dominates
depends on the diffusion of his knowledge within the
bounds of the organization. If this field corresponds
to an area of the firm characterized by a high degree
of overlap among researchers’ knowledge, the organi-
zation’s capabilities will be less dependent on an indi-
vidual inventor, regardless of the outside scarcity and
relative broadness of such knowledge. Conversely, in
areas with less overlapping know-how, the absence
of external alternatives to replace a relatively broad
combination of knowledge will affect its internal and
market value to a similar degree. To the extent that
there is more knowledge overlap in core areas of the
firm, the combination of field dominance and core
expertise implies a higher relative outside value of
the inventor’s knowledge. Thus, core expertise and
field dominance will interact positively on inventors’
mobility.
In conclusion, knowledge overlap makes an indi-
vidual inventor from the firm’s core potentially
more useful for alternative employers. However, core
knowledge is also more difficult to transfer. The for-
mer effect will override the latter if such core knowl-
edge corresponds to a field that the firm dominates
technologically. Therefore, we expect that inventors
working in their employers’ core will move to other
firms when their employer is also a technologically
relevant player in the field.
Hypothesis 3. The more expertise an inventor has in
the firm’s core areas, the more likely he is to move if the
employer is a dominant player in these areas. The more
expertise an inventor has in the firm’s core areas, the less
likely he is to move if the employer is not a dominant player
in these areas.
3. Methodology
3.1. Data
We use patent data to track inventors’ mobility. Patent
documents contain information about the inventors
8 If specialization is low, learning-by-doing also contributes to the
acquisition of a relatively broad range of knowledge in dominated
fields.
as well as the firm that filed the patent, i.e., the
assignee, who is normally the inventors’ employer.9
Thus, by tracking inventors across patents, we can
identify their movements between firms (Trajtenberg
et al. 2006). We draw on U.S. patent data as com-
piled in the National Bureau of Economic Research
(NBER) Patent Citations Data File (Hall et al. 2001),
which comprises all U.S. patents granted between
1970 and 1999.
We focus the analysis on the mobility of inven-
tors working at IBM, a firm that is very active in the
computer, semiconductor, and software industries. Its
status as major innovator and patentholder and its
nonfiring policy10 makes it an interesting subject to
study as a source of knowledge. The industries in
which IBM is active have three important characteris-
tics. First, they are heavily patenting sectors (Ziedonis
2003). This means that patents capture a substantial
part of the innovative activity in the industry and,
therefore, they are useful for tracking mobility. Sec-
ond, research in these sectors is cumulative (Ziedonis
2003, Bessen and Maskin 2009), a fact that is indicative
of the importance of learning. Third, interfirm mobil-
ity of engineers is especially high in these industries
(Almeida and Kogut 1999, Fallick et al. 2006).
We select a random sample of inventors who
appear in at least one patent assigned to IBM at some
point in time between 1970 and 1999 and whose sur-
name begins with the letters A-H. This sample con-
sists initially of 2,195 inventors. Given our interest in
mobility, we consider only inventors whose careers
can be tracked with patent data. This implies drop-
ping inventors: (1) who appear only once in the data
set, (2) whose only non-IBM patent has an uniden-
tified or noninstitutional assignee, or (3) whose IBM
and non-IBM patents all have the same application
year. Another issue that needs to be addressed is col-
laboration between institutions. Results of research
collaborations are sometimes assigned to only one of
the partners involved. This issue could raise prob-
lems of misidentification and artificial mobility in our
sample. To avoid them, we eliminate inventors with
one IBM patent in between several patents by a dif-
ferent assignee. Analogously, we do not consider as
moves the cases in which non-IBM patents appear in
the middle of an IBM patenting sequence. Finally, we
9 Exceptions occur when the inventor files a patent by himself (in
these cases, the assignee is missing) or when he works as a collab-
orator in a patent filed by a firm other than his employer (rare).
10 Until 1992, IBM had a lifetime employment policy for its
employees. Then, the firm offered very advantageous severance
packages to motivate people to leave. This policy is believed to
have motivated the departure of the researchers with better out-
side opportunities, who benefited from the severance packages and
from a new job (Carroll 1994). In any case, both strategies guarantee
that the moving inventors left IBM willingly and were not fired.
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do not take into account moves to spin-outs. Spin-
outs are firms started by former employees of the
incumbent firm. In these cases, mobility is not moti-
vated by an alternative organization’s need to learn
but rather by the search for entrepreneurial oppor-
tunities (Agarwal et al. 2004). In checking the iden-
tity of the hiring firms, we register only one move
to an IBM spin-out, which is excluded from the sam-
ple.11 We also exclude moves originated by the spin-
off of some IBM divisions. This process of fine-tuning
the identification of movers and stayers reduces the
sample to 1,264 inventors, who filed a total of 6,788
patents in IBM during the sample period. We iden-
tify 147 movers from IBM, who represent 12% of
the inventors and are responsible for 10% of IBM
patents.
Tracking mobility through patent data has a num-
ber of limitations. The most important one is that we
can identify a move only if the inventor patents before
as well as after switching employers. Covenants not
to compete may modify the patenting behavior of
a moving inventor and prevent us from observing
his move. Another issue is the truncation of inven-
tors’ patenting lives. Our sample could suffer both left
truncation (we do not know whether they actually
start their inventive activity in the first year in which
we observe them) and right truncation (we do not
know whether there is a move after the last patent
we observe). Also, there are complications in identi-
fying the same inventor over a range of patents due
to possible spelling differences and the fact that there
may be more than one person with the same name.
To address this point, we manually correct potential
spelling errors and apply a series of filters in order
to consider two entries as the same person.12 Despite
these limitations, previous research has shown the
usefulness of patent data to detect inventor mobility
on a small scale (Almeida and Kogut 1999, Song et al.
2003) and, more recently, on a large scale (Trajtenberg
et al. 2006).
11 We also detect some 17 moves to start-ups whose founders we
are unable to track. Although we include them in the final sample,
our empirical findings are robust to their exclusion.
12 The United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) records
contain the following information on the inventor: first name, mid-
dle name, family name, and city and state where he lives, apart
from assignee and patent class of the patented invention. Either
when there is a perfect match on the whole name or there are slight
variations (i.e., when the middle name appears only as an initial),
we require coincidence in assignee, state, or technological subcate-
gory (as defined in Hall et al. 2001). For less clear cases (i.e., when
a middle name appearing only as an initial coincides with the ini-
tial of different full middle names), we require that two of these
elements coincide: assignee, state, or patent class. We also check for
time consistency (i.e., we identify two different persons when a full
name appears working at two different locations for several years).
3.2. Analysis
We use event history analysis to estimate the hazard
rate that an engineer changes employer during his
research life. The inventor’s research life is proxied by
his patenting life and an employer shift by a change
in the assignee of the patent in which he appears as
an inventor. The inventor is observed in a sequence of
discrete time points that correspond to his patent fil-
ings. Consequently, he is at risk only when he patents;
otherwise, we are not able to observe his moves.
The result is an unbalanced panel where each
inventor contributes Ti times, Ti being the number of
times the inventor is at risk, i.e., the number of patents
he files until he leaves (if he is a mover) and the num-
ber of patents he files until survival time is censored
minus one otherwise (in the last spell, we can not
identify whether he stays or he moves). The hazard
function takes the form
ut+ 1Z	= tZtt	  u
	 (1)
where  is the generic expression for the hazard rate
of moving between t and t+ 1	. The functional form
we choose for the baseline hazard function is logarith-
mic. The term Zt is the vector of time variant explana-
tory variables observed at t. The term 
 is the vector
of parameters to be estimated, and u is a random vari-
able that adds unobserved heterogeneity to the model
and is distributed independently of Z and t. The term
u captures the impact of omitted variables, particu-
larly the inventor’s personal characteristics (i.e., abil-
ity, education, age, gender, marital status, number of
children) as well the characteristics of the offer that
the inventor receives (i.e., wage offered, firm’s repu-
tation, new colleagues, whether move implies change
of location, challenges of new job), which are likely to
affect the hazard rate but are unknown.
To model the hazard rate in discrete time with
time-dependent covariates, we use a binary response
model (Yamaguchi 1991). In particular, we use a pro-
bit random effects specification in order to account for
the individual unobserved heterogeneity caused by
individual-specific omitted variables (Jenkins 2005).13
3.3. Explanatory Variables
The dependent variable that reflects mobility is a
dummy variable taking value 0 if the inventor does
not move in the subsequent period he is at risk, i.e., if
the next patent is assigned to IBM, and 1 otherwise.14
13 The alternative in order to take unobserved heterogeneity into
account, the logit fixed effects specification, would only consider
noncensored individuals, i.e., inventors who move. In any case, the
Hausman test does not reject the null hypothesis of consistency of
the random effects model.
14 Note that the last patent at IBM in censored individuals and the
patents out of IBM in noncensored individuals do not contribute
as observations (in these cases, they are not at risk in next period).
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Independent variables are described next. Note that
they are computed in a cumulative way up to each of
the inventor’s risk periods.
Quality. The extent to which a patent is valuable is
usually proxied by the number of citations it receives
from subsequent patents, which reflects its contri-
bution to technological progress. Given that patents
must cite the related prior art, the number of citations
received is considered an indicator of the technologi-
cal relevance of a given patent. Jaffe et al. (2000) find
that the number of citations received by a patent is
correlated with the inventors’ perception of its tech-
nological value and with its economic value. Several
studies corroborate the positive correlation between
citations received and objective measures of economic
value (Harhoff et al. 1999, Hall et al. 2005). Thus, in
order to capture the quality of an inventor’s knowl-
edge at a given point of time, we draw on the cita-
tions received by the patents he has filed up to that
moment. In particular, we compute the average stan-
dardized citations received.15 16
Complementarity. In his study of firms’ appropriabil-
ity, Ahuja (2007) uses the average number of inventors
on a given firm’s patents to measure the firm’s degree
of labor division. Analogously, we rely on the number
of inventors listed in the patent document in order to
capture the degree of complementarity of the knowl-
edge of the inventors working on the innovation. This
is a good measure of the team that actually worked
on the innovation, given that all relevant contributors
must be stated in the patent document if the property
right is to be enforced (Klee 1998). Although the num-
ber of coinventors is a variable that does not capture
the internal processes developed during the project,
we expect it to be strongly correlated with the num-
ber of interactions and, therefore, with the potential
complementarities developed. In particular, we com-
pute the mean number of coinventors per patent in
the inventor’s set of patents up to a given point in
time.
Core. Following the rationale of Song et al. (2003)
to identify core technology areas of large firms, we
consider that an innovation falls within IBM’s core
15 Standardization is necessary because patents granted in different
years have different time spans over which to receive citations. Fol-
lowing Hall et al. (2001), we standardize the citations each patent
receives by the mean citations received by the population of patents
applied in its same year and technological category.
16 Alternatively, we could use the total number of (standardized)
citations received. Such measure, however, is highly correlated with
the number of patents filed by the inventor, an important control
variable in our analysis. By using the average citations received, we
avoid multicollinearity problems and, at the same time, we are able
to disentangle the effect of knowledge quality from that of research
intensity (captured by the number of patents).
if its patent class coincides with some of the time-
variant highest frequent classes in the firm’s portfo-
lio. Given that IBM patents are very dispersed across
patent classes, we define core classes as those that
represent more than 2.5% of the firm’s portfolio in a
given five-year time window.17 To measure the inven-
tor’s experience in IBM’s core areas in each of his risk
periods, we build a variable that gathers the percent-
age of his patents that falls within the firm’s core up
to that time.
Field dominance. Our purpose is to develop a mea-
sure of the relative importance of a specific firm
in a specific technological field. Thus, we adopt the
methodology used by Shane (2001). To assess the role
of university inventions in a given technological field,
he measures the share of patents assigned to univer-
sities in each field and year. In a similar vein, we
use the share of IBM patents filed in a given techno-
logical subcategory and time window with respect to
the total number of USPTO patents in that subcate-
gory and interval. In this way, we capture the relative
importance of IBM innovations in a given area. We
then compute, for each inventor and point in time,
the mean dominance of IBM in the technological sub-
categories in which he has patented up to that point.
3.4. Control Variables
Number of patents. This variable tracks the sequence
of patents filed by the inventor in IBM (the base-
line time hazard). At the organizational level, patent
counts is considered a good indicator of the inputs
to the innovative process (i.e., R&D efforts), but not
of the value of the results (Trajtenberg 1990). Anal-
ogously, an inventor’s number of registered patents
can be considered a good proxy of the intensity of his
research activity. Previous empirical studies find that
inventors’ intensity of research activity has a negative
or insignificant effect on mobility (Zucker et al. 2002,
Geuna et al. 2006, Hoisl 2007). Because research activ-
ity could also be correlated with the characteristics of
the inventor’s knowledge, the number of patents is
an important control variable in our analysis. There-
fore, we introduce the number of patents filed by the
inventor with IBM up to each point of time.
Tenure. This variable reflects the years that the
inventor has worked in the firm. It has been exten-
sively noted in the labor economics literature that,
as tenure increases, the probability of job change
diminishes drastically, basically because people get
established at their job and gain firm-specific human
capital (Topel and Ward 1992). We proxy tenure with
the difference in years between the application year
17 In IBM, no single patent class gathers the 10% share of the firm’s
portfolio that Song et al. (2003) suggest for the definition of core.
For this reason, we choose the more restrictive threshold of 2.5%.
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of the first IBM patent filed by the inventor and the
application year of each of his subsequent patents.
Technological area. The specific area in which the
inventor patents may affect his external value and
other variables such as productivity or quality. We
create a set of dummy variables that gather the per-
centage of the inventor’s patents that falls in each
of the technological categories defined by Hall et al.
(2001) on the basis of patent classes.
Self-citations received. A patent can receive citations
from another patent owned by the same firm. As
previous research has suggested, self-citations may
reflect differently the value of the innovation than
external citations, as their respective inclusion in the
patent document may obey to different motivations
(Hall et al. 2005). We take this into account by con-
trolling for the ratio of self-citations. In particular,
we measure this variable as the mean percentage of
self-citations that the inventor receives in his set of
patents.
Dispersion of citations received. To accurately reflect
the quality of the inventor’s work, it is necessary to
take into account the dispersion of the citations he
receives across patents. As a measure of quality, we
use the average citations that an inventor receives
per patent, and we control for the number of patents
in the analysis. Nevertheless, two inventors with the
same mean quality per patent and number of patents
can be valued very differently by the market accord-
ing to how dispersed their citations are across patents.
For this reason, we also control for the standard devi-
ation of the citations received by the inventor’s set of
patents.
Region. Almeida and Kogut (1999) provide evidence
of regional differences in the intensity of labor mar-
ket flows for engineers. Furthermore, they show that
mobility is mostly intraregional. Because IBM research
facilities are located at various points in the United
States and worldwide, the existence of an active labor
market, and the concentration of firms in each region
will affect the probability that an inventor receives
an external offer as well as the probability that he
accepts it. We use the state that appears in the patent
as the inventor’s address (New York, California,
Texas, Minnesota, Vermont, and non–United States) to
create a set of dummy variables that capture in which
IBM facilities the inventor previously worked.
Time. It is necessary to control for time effects in
order to take account of potential changes across
years that could influence the prospects of mobility.
These changes can be either environmental (indus-
try or macroeconomic issues), or IBM-related (e.g.,
human resources practices and its leadership posi-
tion in the sector). We use patent application years
to take account of time effects. Also, to control for
cohort effects, we introduce the earliest year (grouped
in intervals) in which the inventor patented at IBM.
Previous mobility. In general, workers who have
moved in the past are more likely to switch employ-
ers again (Topel and Ward 1992). In particular, inven-
tors who arrived to IBM from another company may
be more mobile than those who have developed their
whole career in IBM. This may be because they have
different personal characteristics, more diverse social
networks, or simply a weaker commitment to the
firm. To control for previous mobility, we introduce a
dummy variable that captures whether the inventor
patented outside IBM before enrolling with the firm.
4. Results
Descriptive statistics and correlations for the inde-
pendent variables at inventor level are shown in
Tables 1 and 2. Table 3 displays the coefficient
estimates for different specifications of the model pre-
sented in Equation (1). Table 4 reports the correspond-
ing marginal effects computed at the mean of each
explanatory variable, keeping the rest of indepen-
dent variables at their means as well.18 Because con-
tinuous variables are log transformed, the marginal
effect of each one reflects the percentage increase in
the probability of moving when its value increases
twofold (i.e., by 100%) from its mean. Finally, Table 5
presents average marginal effects, i.e., the mean of
the marginal effects predicted for all the observations
of the sample. Although the mean marginal effects
are more informative than the marginal effects at the
mean, the latter approach is more common in the lit-
erature (Hoetker 2007). In our study, however, the
figures presented in Tables 4 and 5 are relatively sim-
ilar. The unit of observation is the inventor each time
he patents at IBM, excluded the last time that a cen-
sored inventor does. Each observation captures (i) the
characteristics of the inventor’s stock of knowledge at
this point of time, and (ii) whether he files his next
patent with IBM or with a different firm. In all but one
specification, the proportion of the total error variance
accounted for by the random effect is very small in
magnitude and not statistically significant.
All specifications include the time invariant con-
trol variables, i.e., the inventor’s year of entry into
the sample and the previous mobility dummy, as
well as the time variant controls, i.e., the patent year,
the inventor’s tenure, and the technological categories
and regions where he has patented. The estimated
probability of moving in a given interpatent spell for
an inventor with all the variables at their mean, is
approximately 1.8%.
18 Note that the marginal effect of each variable depends on the
values of the rest of variables of the model. We choose the mean
values of the original variables at the inventor level as the most
meaningful point to evaluate the marginal effects.
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Table 1 Descriptive Statistics at the Inventor Level
Variables Mean Std. dev. Median Min Max
Number of patents per inventor 319 317 2 1 4450
Mean of standardized citations received per patent 170 171 127 0 16
Mean number of coinventors per patent 394 211 359 1 23
Percentage of patents in the core per inventor 0241 0356 0 0 1
Mean degree of scarcity of the inventor’s patents 0047 0032 0048 00006 0105
Standard deviation of the citations received by inventor 104 156 0503 0 1421
Mean percentage of self-citations received per patent 0181 0189 0144 0 1
Tenure 390 317 282 1 19
Percentage of patents in category 1 (chemical) 0089 0243 0 0 1
Percentage of patents in category 2 (computers and communications) 0557 0462 075 0 1
Percentage of patents in category 4 (electrical and electronic) 0229 0365 0 0 1
Percentage of patents in category 5 (mechanical) 0090 0246 0 0 1
Percentage of patents in category 6 (others) 0035 0149 0 0 1
Percentage of patents in region 1 (New York) 0346 0476 0 0 1
Percentage of patents in region 2 (California) 0109 0312 0 0 1
Percentage of patents in region 3 (Texas) 0106 0308 0 0 1
Percentage of patents in region 4 (Vermont and Minnesota) 0127 0334 0 0 1
Percentage of patents in region 5 (United States, missing state) 0263 0440 0 0 1
Percentage of patents in region 6 (outside United States) 0131 0338 0 0 1
Entry year at IBM 1987 737 1989 1968 1998
Move from IBM 0116 0320 0 0 1
Note. N = 1264 inventors.
The time effect is represented by the number of
times the inventor has patented. The coefficient of
this variable is significantly negative, meaning that the
more patents an inventor files in the firm, the lower
his hazard of moving. This negative effect is consis-
tently robust across specifications, although the inten-
sity is reduced when we control for patent quality.
According to Table 5, a 100% increase in the num-
ber of patents decreases the probability of moving,
on average, by 1.2%. Alternatively, a 10% increase
from its mean value, i.e., a shift from 3.2 to 3.5
patents, would decrease the probability by approxi-
mately 0.1%, according to Table 4. This result is con-
sistent with the argument posed by Hoisl (2007) that
departure probability decreases with the number of
patents filed by an inventor with a given firm, because
it reflects a good match between firm and employee.
The coefficient of Quality is positive and significant,
supporting the first hypothesis: the greater the quality
Table 2 Correlations at the Inventor Level
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
(1) Number of patents —
(2) Mean standardized citations per patent 01230 —
(3) Mean coinventors per patent −00144 00779 —
(4) Percentage of core patents 01075∗ −00859∗ −00399 —
(5) Mean scarcity per patent −00002 −01804∗ −00938∗ 06350∗ —
(6) Mean % of self-citations per patent 00960∗ 00556∗ 00604∗ 01314∗ 01170∗ —
(7) Standard deviation of citations 02703∗ 06697∗ 00513∗ −00638∗ −01671∗ 00185 —
(8) Tenure 05383∗ 01738∗ −00834 −00384 −00888∗ 00457∗ 02856∗
(9) Entry year −01823∗ −01210∗ 02551∗ 01511∗ 01147∗ −00119 −01172∗ −06265∗
∗p < 0001.
of an inventor, the more likely he is to move. This
positive effect is robust across specifications and its
average magnitude amounts to 1.1% when the mean
citations received per patent doubles. The variable
that captures the Complementarity of the inventor’s
knowledge displays a significantly negative effect that
confirms the second hypothesis, i.e., that the more
complementary the inventor’s know-how, the less
likely he is to move. Specifically, the probability of
moving is, on average, 0.9% lower if the number of
coinventors per patent increases twofold.
The variables Core and Technological Dominance
present nonsignificant effects when considered inde-
pendently. When the interaction between Core and
Technological Dominance is introduced, the effect of
Core is significantly negative for values of Domi-
nance close to zero. The interaction between these
two variables is positive and significant at 10%.
However, the joint effect of the Core variable plus
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Table 3 Probit Random Effects on the Probability of an Inventor’s Move: Coefficient Estimates
Variables Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3 Specification 4 Specification 5
Core −0049 −0453∗
0117 0250
Dominance 2594 −0295
2320 2800
Core ∗Dominance 6893∗
3675
Complementarity −0159∗ −0164∗∗ −0163∗∗
0083 0083 0084
Quality 0167∗ 0192∗∗ 0195∗∗ 0203∗∗
0093 0093 0093 0094
Self-citations −1242∗∗∗ −1226∗∗∗ −1243∗∗∗ −1245∗∗∗
0265 0264 0267 0265
Citation dispersion −0059∗ −0061∗ −0062∗ −0062∗
0035 0035 0035 0035
Number of patents −0278∗∗∗ −0212∗∗∗ −0215∗∗∗ −0221∗∗∗ −0214∗∗∗
0071 0074 0074 0074 0074
Tenure 0111 0116 0127 0128 0133
0100 0103 0103 0104 0104
Previous mobility 0220∗ 0202 0197 0202 0206
0129 0131 0132 0132 0132
Category 1 0693∗ 0710∗ 0717∗∗ 0703∗ 0715∗
0363 0374 0376 0375 0374
Category 2 0490 0546 0519 0374 0477
0334 0347 0349 0375 0377
Category 4 0481 0465 0433 0372 0454
0345 0354 0357 0363 0364
Category 5 0534 0498 0490 0492 0567
0366 0375 0378 0378 0379
Region 1 −0054 −0007 −0008 −0020 −0017
0112 0113 0113 0114 0114
Region 2 0356∗∗∗ 0380∗∗∗ 0370∗∗∗ 0360∗∗∗ 0342∗∗∗
0125 0126 0127 0127 0128
Region 3 0223 0204 0183 0168 0164
0139 0139 0140 0141 0141
Region 4 −0025 0002 −0000 −0016 −0005
0131 0134 0134 0135 0136
Region 5 0214∗∗∗ 0212∗ 0208∗ 0204∗ 0200∗
0108 0110 0110 0110 0110
Entry time Included Included Included Included Included
Patent time Included Included Included Included Included
Constant −1970∗∗∗ −2008∗∗∗ −1900∗∗∗ −1907∗∗∗ −1929∗∗∗
0605 0635 0640 −0639 0643
Observations 5,670 5,670 5,670 5,670 5,670
Number of individuals 1,264 1,264 1,264 1,264 1,264
Wald chi2 7450∗∗ 9711∗∗∗ 10017∗∗∗ 10118∗∗∗ 10428∗∗∗
Rho 0000 0003 7.21e−06 0000 6.08e−07
Note. Dependent variable: Move from IBM.
∗p < 010, ∗∗p < 005, ∗∗∗p < 001 denotes significant levels of the coefficients.
the interaction is not significantly greater than zero
at the maximum value of Technological Dominance.19
Therefore, Hypothesis 3 is only partially supported.
Inventors with more experience in Core areas with low
19 Because Technological Dominance is a continuous variable, we
tested the significance of the joint effect of Core plus the interaction
at the minimum and maximum level of Dominance. Although in the
first case, the effect is significant at the 7% level, in the second case,
the effect is not significant.
IBM Dominance have lower probability of leaving the
firm. As the Technological Dominance of IBM increases,
the negative effect of Core on mobility diminishes.
However, there does not exist a level of Dominance
high enough in our sample to make the effect of Core
significantly positive. Figure 1 displays the condi-
tional effects plot for Core at different values of Techno-
logical Dominance (its minimum, mean and maximum
levels). The rest of the variables are at their mean
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Table 4 Probit Random Effects on the Probability of an Inventor’s Move: Marginal Effects at the Mean
Variables Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3 Specification 4 Specification 5
Core −0002 −0020∗
0005 0011
Dominance 0113 −0013
0102 0122
Core ∗Dominance 0300∗
0163
Complementarity −0007∗∗ −0007∗∗ −0007∗∗
0003 0004 0003
Quality 0008∗∗ 0008∗∗ 0009∗∗ 0009∗∗∗
0004 0003 0003 0003
Self-citations −0059∗∗∗ −0054∗∗∗ −0054∗∗∗ −0054∗∗∗
0013 0012 0012 0012
Citation dispersion −0003∗ −0003∗ −0003∗ −0003∗
0002 0001 0001 0001
Number of patents −0016∗∗∗ −0010∗∗ −0009∗∗ −0010∗∗ −0009∗∗
0005 0004 0004 0004 0004
Tenure 0006 0005 0006 0006 0006
0006 0005 0005 0005 0005
Note. Dependent variable: Move from IBM.
∗p < 010, ∗∗p < 005, ∗∗∗p < 001 denotes significant levels of the coefficients.
(except for the controls of time and region, which
are set at their mode). The chart shows the positive
effect on the probability of moving of an increase in
Core expertise when Technological Dominance is at its
maximum. Despite the steep slope of the dotted line,
the imprecision of the estimation of the interaction
makes this effect not significant. For values of Dom-
inance at its mean or below, Core displays a nega-
tive effect. Figure 1 also shows that the probability of
moving increases with Dominance if the Core patents
represent more than 4.3% of the inventor’s portfolio
Table 5 Probit Random Effects on the Probability of an Inventor’s Move: Average Marginal Effects
Variables Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3 Specification 4 Specification 5
Core −0003 −0025∗
0007 0014
Dominance 0145 −0016
0130 0156
Core ∗Dominance 0384∗
0208
Complementarity −0009∗ −0009∗ −0009∗
0005 0005 0005
Quality 0009∗ 0011∗∗ 0011∗∗ 0011∗∗
0005 0005 0005 0005
Self-citations −0070∗∗∗ −0069∗∗∗ −0069∗∗∗ −0069∗∗∗
0015 0015 0015 0015
Citation dispersion −0003∗ −0003∗ −0003∗ −0003∗
0002 0002 0002 0002
Number of patents −0016∗∗∗ −0012∗∗∗ −0012∗∗∗ −0012∗∗∗ −0012∗∗∗
0004 0004 0004 0004 0004
Tenure 0006 0006 0007 0007 0007
0006 0006 0006 0006 0006
Note. Dependent variable: Move from IBM.
∗p < 010, ∗∗p < 005, ∗∗∗p < 001 denotes significant levels of the coefficients.
(the 32nd percentile of the sample). Figure 2 helps to
interpret the marginal effect of the interaction cor-
rectly. As Norton et al. (2004) note, the sign, mag-
nitude, and significance of the marginal effect varies
across observations. This figure displays the interac-
tion effect for all observations, which is positive for
all of them, but it is not always significant.
4.1. Some Robustness Checks
Some assumptions in the foregoing analysis may be
problematic. First, we do not take account of knowl-
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Figure 1 Conditional Effect Plot: Core Expertise for Different Levels of
Scarcity (All Other Variables at Their Mean)
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edge depreciation over time. Second, we do not
distinguish whether hiring firms are competitors or
noncompetitors of the focal firm. We address both
issues below.
From the methodological point of view, one might
question the contribution to an inventor’s current
knowledge of the innovations carried out many years
ago. If technological knowledge is subject to a high
rate of depreciation, its characteristics will be more
accurately measured by taking into account only the
innovations from the last few years. To explore this
issue, we develop an alternative measure for each
characteristic that includes information only from the
patents filed within the 10 years prior to the focal
observation. The results are qualitatively similar to
those obtained for the measures that consider the full
history of inventors.
A second potentially controversial point of our
analysis is that we pool together all kinds of moves,
independently of whether the hiring firm is a direct
IBM competitor or not. We deliberately do so because
our theoretical framework focuses on the characteris-
tics of an inventor’s knowledge that make him more
likely to move, regardless of the nature of the hir-
ing firm. Nonetheless, strategic issues could affect the
Figure 2 Interaction Effects After Probit
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value of hiring (and retaining) the inventor when the
poaching firm is a direct competitor of IBM. If knowl-
edge characteristics such as quality interact with these
strategic issues, their effect on mobility may differ
according to the nature of the hiring firm. To address
this point, we retrieve patent data on the hiring firms
of the 147 moving inventors in our sample and clas-
sify them as competitors and noncompetitors accord-
ing to their technological overlap with IBM.20 Then,
we perform a multinomial probit analysis where we
consider moving to a competitor (53 cases) and mov-
ing to a noncompetitor (94 cases) as two different
competing risks. Results do not show any significant
difference in the effect of knowledge characteristics
on the probability of moving to competitors versus
moving to noncompetitors.
5. Discussion and Conclusion
In this paper, we analyze the moves of inventors
between employers under the perspective of learning-
by-hiring. The study focuses on the effect of dif-
ferent characteristics of the knowledge accumulated
by the inventors over their inventive career on their
probability of changing employer. The effect of these
attributes depends on their relative value for the cur-
rent employer with respect to the market. If prospec-
tive employers value a particular feature more than
the incumbent employer does, it contributes posi-
tively to the probability that the inventor moves.
In particular, we predict that (i) the quality of the
inventor’s innovations, (ii) the complementarity of his
knowledge with that of other inventors, and (iii) his
expertise in the core areas of the firm in which it is a
dominant player, have a relevant impact on the rela-
tive value of the inventor’s knowledge in the current
firm versus the market.
We examine empirically the moves of inventors
from IBM, a large firm active in the computer, semi-
conductor, and software industries. Consistent with
predictions, we find that the probability of an inven-
tor moving is negatively affected by the extent to
which his knowledge is complementary and by his
expertise in core areas of the firm in which it is
not a technologically dominant player. Conversely, an
increase in the mean level of quality of the inven-
tor’s work positively affects his probability of moving.
However, our findings do not support the predic-
tion that greater core expertise in areas that the firm
technologically dominates increases the probability of
moving. Our rationale is based on the argument that
the complementary effect of technological dominance
and internal overlap on mobility should compensate
20 In particular, we classify as competitors those firms that share
some core technological area with IBM.
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the negative effect of high firm-level embeddedness
of core knowledge. The results suggest that this latter
effect is more persistent than what we have assumed.
Indeed, the negative impact of firm-level embedded-
ness on knowledge transfer leads to lower mobility
of inventors from the core. This is only partially com-
pensated by the technological dominance of the focal
firm.
From the point of view of knowledge manage-
ment, these findings support the idea that learning
is a relevant driver of hiring away. Previous litera-
ture has pointed out that firms use hiring away as a
mechanism to learn from the knowledge developed
at other firms and embodied in their creators. The
findings of this paper offer a new perspective on this
topic and suggest that firms hire away the inventors
from whom they can actually learn. Taken together,
the characteristics of the knowledge embodied in the
moving inventors indicate that hires are motivated
by learning. First, the support for the first hypothesis
suggests that hiring firms are especially interested in
learning high-quality knowledge. Among the many
instances of inventors that could better exploit their
knowledge outside their current employer, only those
with potential to generate superior value move. Fur-
thermore, we find that inventors with core knowledge
are less likely to move unless their current employer
is also a dominant player in the field. This result
underlines the role of firm-level knowledge embed-
dedness associated with core areas. When knowledge
is more embedded in the firm structures, mobil-
ity of workers decreases, because learning-by-hiring
becomes more difficult. Finally, the result that comple-
mentary knowledge hinders mobility indicates that
hiring firms are actually seeking in the inventor the
ability to seize and transfer the know-how behind an
innovation, and this diminishes with the degree of
complementarity of his knowledge.
All in all, results suggest learning as a driver of hir-
ing away. However, taken in isolation, some results
are consistent with alternative interpretations. This
is the case of high-quality inventors as more likely
movers. One could argue that the market actually val-
ues the ability to develop high-quality innovations.
If the incumbent employer has better information on
the inventors’ abilities than the market, patent qual-
ity can work as a signal that reduces this informative
advantage (Spence 1973, Greenwald 1986). There-
fore, holders of high-quality patents should be more
mobile because they are more visible to the market
than inventors with equivalent ability but with lower-
quality patents. The asymmetric information story
could also fit the result that inventors with higher
complementary knowledge are less mobile. Indeed,
the more complementary the knowledge of an inven-
tor, the weaker the signal that his patents send to the
market. However, this rationale cannot explain the
finding that inventors from core areas that the firm
does not technologically dominate are less likely to
move. If anything, problems of information asymme-
try that hamper mobility should be lower in these
areas, given the relative abundance of inventors with
similar skills.
This research is also relevant from the perspec-
tive of human resource management at innovative
firms. Findings suggest that researchers holding high-
quality knowledge are the ones most likely to leave
their current employer. Even if the firm has mecha-
nisms to appropriate their current innovations, their
departure may harm the firm’s ability to innovate in
the future. Therefore, innovative firms trying to pre-
vent this knowledge loss should implement mecha-
nisms to dissuade such inventors from defecting, and
to minimize the impact of defections that occur.21 One
such mechanism is the use of research teams, as sug-
gested by our result on complementary knowledge.
That is, inventors working with a larger number of
coinventors are less likely to leave the firm. Thus,
promoting complementary research even above orga-
nizationally efficient levels is an approach to make
it less attractive for other firms to poach in-house
inventors. Another such mechanism is establishing
structures that harness inventors’ ideas, energy, and
motivations. Lindholm-Dahlstrand (2001) reports that
start-ups are generally formed by researchers whose
projects have been rejected by their employers. Analo-
gously, we find some evidence that frustrated projects
could also play some role in interfirm mobility
of inventors. Results reveal that the percentage of
self-citations received by an inventor’s patent nega-
tively affect his probability of moving. If self-citations
received reflect the continuity of a given research
line inside the firm, this result suggests that movers’
projects receive less internal attention. In a similar
vein, our finding that inventors with more patents
are less likely to leave may reflect that inventors who
find useful resources and structures to develop their
ideas accumulate firm-specific skills that make them
stay. Further research should establish to what extent
researchers are motivated to leave by the rejection of
their ideas or by the lack of structures to exploit them.
The research presented in this article is subject to
several limitations. First of all, patent data does not
allow scrutinizing the internal processes at work dur-
ing the innovation project. This compels us to rely
in an imperfect measure of complementarity, such as
21 Note that, in the long run, it is not necessarily optimal to restrict
inventor’s mobility. As noted by Lewis and Yao (2006), allowing
inventors to move may enable the firm to hire more talented sci-
entists and to provide them with stronger incentives. These advan-
tages, however, must be traded off against the reduced incentives
for the employer to invest in the human capital of its workers.
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the average number of coinventors. Furthermore, the
exact contribution of each coinventor to a given inno-
vation cannot be assessed with our data, so that we
need to assume that innovation characteristics relate
to knowledge characteristics equally for all coinven-
tors. Secondly, the findings of this paper arise from
the study of a specific firm in a specific sector, i.e., the
leader of a sector characterized by cumulative innova-
tion and patenting. Even if hiring away appears as an
important mechanism of external knowledge acquisi-
tion in innovative firms, it is likely that the patterns of
innovation, appropriability, and learning differ from
industry to industry. Moreover, IBM nonfiring pol-
icy has typically kept its nonvoluntary turnover rate
at low levels, so that drivers of mobility other than
learning-by-hiring probably play a minor role in our
study. Consequently, we should be cautious about
generalizing the results. Further research is needed
to assess whether the same drivers of mobility apply
to other industries as well as to nonleading firms.
Despite these limitations, this analysis contributes to
the understanding of the role of knowledge flows and
mobility. Further research should also aim at explor-
ing this phenomenon from other angles. We should
understand what kind of firms rely on learning-by-
hiring and how they fit this knowledge into their
internal knowledge structure. The consequences of
mobility for innovative activity in the source firms
should also be examined.
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